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Guidelines Simplification: Still an Urgent
Priority Post-Booker

The framers of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
right to be concerned about disparity; when similarly situated defendants receive dramatically different sentences,
punishment is seen as a matter of judicial whim, not principle, and the criminal justice system loses some of its
moral authority. The framers were also right to view Sentencing Guidelines as a helpful tool for achieving greater
uniformity. But they were wrong to think that Guidelines
should attempt to dictate sentencing consequences in a
precise fashion for hundreds of different offense characteristics. As a result of their efforts to ensure additional
punishment for nearly every significant way that offenders
create incremental harm or danger, we have a notoriously
complicated set of Federal Guidelines, far more detailed
than any state has adopted. The Federal Guidelines are
routinely compared to the tax code, and, like the tax code,
have inspired frequent calls for simplification. Although
this basic structural weakness of the Guidelines has been
overshadowed in recent years by debates over crack
cocaine sentencing and the meaning of Booker, simplification ought to remain very near the top of the federal
sentencing reform agenda.
To be sure, simplification might be accomplished in
any of a number of different ways, some of which would
be even more pernicious than the existing system. For
instance, Guidelines that merely assigned a specific sentence to each federal crime would be much simpler to
administer than the current Guidelines but would ignore
far too much of the variation among offenders who are
convicted of violating the same statutory provision. The
existing system is right to focus the sentencing judge’s
attention on commonly occurring “real-offense” characteristics that serve to distinguish more from less severe
instances of the same crime. The problems arise from
assigning specific weights to an excessive number of realoffense characteristics.
An excellent model for simplification appeared in these
pages not so long ago. Building on a framework for federal
sentencing reforms proposed by the bipartisan Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative, a small working group
of sentencing experts developed a partial set of model
Guidelines, which were published in the June 2006 issue
of FSR.1 From the standpoint of simplification, crucial fea-

tures that differentiate the model Guidelines from the
existing Guidelines include the following:
1. Only eleven offense levels on the sentencing grid,
instead of the existing forty-three;
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2. Wider sentencing ranges associated with each
offense level (except at the very top and bottom of
the offense level scale); and
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3. Fewer specific offense characteristics triggering
mandatory adjustments to the offense level.
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For purposes of selecting a sentence within the wider
ranges, the model Guidelines recommend (or, in some
cases, require) consideration of additional offense characteristics.2 The model Guidelines thus remove the
mandatory weight assigned to many characteristics but
still ultimately focus the sentencing judge’s attention on
much the same range of factors as the existing Guidelines.
The model Guidelines thus avoid the crude categorizations associated with a charge-offense system or
mandatory minimums.
Simplified Guidelines drafted along these lines would
offer at least three important advantages over the existing
Guidelines. First, the model Guidelines offer greater flexibility to make the sentence fit the crime. The attempt to ensure
a more severe sentence for each increment of harm or danger caused by the defendant was misguided from the start.
Real-world complexity means that sentence enhancements
frequently interact in unexpected ways, with some nonviolent offenses triggering a multitude of small enhancements
that result in longer sentences than would be authorized for
some serious violent crimes.3 Moreover, the obsessive focus
on incremental harm and danger overshadows more subjective questions of motive and mental state that must play a
central role in any morally sound effort to assess the seriousness of a criminal offense.4 Simply put, our complex
Guidelines make it hard to see the forest for the trees. A
simplified Guidelines system, including healthy measures
of discretion within wide ranges, would more clearly invite
sentencing judges to assess specific offense characteristics
within an appropriate, big-picture setting.
Second, simplified Guidelines better accommodate due
process concerns. Whatever its failings, the Apprendi line of
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cases has served to remind us that process matters. Vitally
important questions of human liberty turn on what facts
are found at sentencing, and (quite apart from constitutional mandate) we owe it to our defendants to find those
facts through reliable processes that offer a robust opportunity to be heard. At the same time, it is not administratively
feasible to offer the full panoply of criminal procedure protections with respect to every real-offense characteristic that
ought to be considered in a sound sentencing regime. The
model Guidelines offer an attractive compromise: sentencing facts are distinguished, with the most important (those
that determine the range) found using higher procedural
protections than are used for the less important (those considered by a judge in determining the sentence within the
range). By contrast, in the more complicated system, where
a much larger number of facts are capable of moving the
range, it is hard to imagine how enhanced procedural protections could realistically be afforded.
Third, a simplified system may more readily resist
“factor creep.” New sentence enhancements have been
routinely added to the Guidelines in response to whatever
happens to be the crime du jour, typically at the insistence of Congress and/or the Department of Justice.
Although these sorts of amendments contribute to the
forest/trees problem discussed earlier, it is hard to resist
new enhancements when there are already so many in
place, particularly when it is clear that existing enhancements are by no means limited to the most important
aggravating circumstances. With a simplified system that
gives range-determining effect to only a limited number
of the most important considerations, it becomes easier
to demonstrate why less important considerations should
not be accorded the same status. If the political branches
demand some symbolic recognition of a significant new
public concern, this can be accomplished by adding factors to the “should consider” category used for
determining the sentence within a range.
To be sure, some may argue that the restoration of judicial discretion pursuant to Booker has mooted most or all
of the claims that might be made in favor of simplification. If the Guidelines are now merely advisory, why
concern ourselves with their structure? Yet, as variance
rates indicate, it is perfectly clear that the Guidelines continue to matter a great deal in the post-Booker world.
Indeed, as long as sentencing judges are required to calculate the Guidelines range before exercising discretion,
basic psychological principles suggest that this range will
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have an “anchoring” effect, shaping the final outcome in
important, if subtle, ways.5 In light of this reality, it is still
very much worthwhile to get the Guidelines right.
Others may argue that the simplified system would
invite too much judicial discretion and thereby return us
to the bad old days of rampant disparity. But it is important to remember that the simplified ranges, while wider
than the existing ranges, still tend to be much narrower
than statutory ranges, meaning that judicial discretion will
still fall far short of that exercised in pre-Guidelines days.
More fundamentally, as a result of their clumsy and profligate enhancements, the existing Guidelines themselves
draw many arbitrary distinctions among defendants—if
this is a system of uniformity, then disparity no longer
looks quite so bad. A system concerned with its moral
authority does little better in choosing arbitrary rules of
general application than it does in permitting arbitrary
exercises of judicial discretion. A more balanced system
that gives greater room for discretion to function in an
open, principled manner should inspire more respect over
the long run. The model Guidelines provide a framework
for just such a system.
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The Constitution Project’s report on federal sentencing is
excerpted at Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative, Recommendations for Federal Criminal Sentencing in a Post-Booker
World, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 310 (2006). For a description of the
working group’s composition and processes, see Frank O.
Bowman III, ’Tis a Gift to Be Simple: A Model Reform of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 301, 303
(2006). In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that I
was a member of the working group. It is perhaps also
appropriate to note that the working group included practicing criminal defense lawyers but no current (only former)
prosecutors. At the same time, there was no systematic
effort to reduce sentences across the board, and, in any
event, the structure proposed by the working group could be
adopted independently of any particular severity judgments
reflected in the model Guidelines. Id. at 306.
The working group was divided as to whether some of these
offense characteristics, although not important enough to
justify raising the entire range, should nonetheless result in
an increase to the bottom of the range (thereby effectively
reducing the scope of judicial discretion). Id. at 305-6.
Michael M. O’Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. SENT. REP.
249, 252 (2005).
Id. at 251.
Michael M. O’Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity: Implementing
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) after Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627,
645 (2006).
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